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Abstract: This paper focuses on the ways in which political actors make use of historical legacies to
present their own determination to sustain their country’s national security. We use the example of
the annual celebrations of the anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising (SNU) to demonstrate
the ways in which similar celebrations can become a platform for political actors to express requests
and address their audience. Using semi-participant observation, we have analyzed six years of
these celebrations (2015–2020) and the securitizing strategies and moral panic creation strategies
contained in the speeches of participating politicians. Our analysis shows that securitization is taking
place, and labels of threat sources are being given not only to topics that are naturally linked to the
celebrated event, but also topics that are in no way related to SNU. Despite this fact, politicians use
the legitimacy of the event to manifest their own attempts at sustaining security.
Keywords: securitization; moral panic; public ceremonies; use of history; sustainability of security;
Slovak politics; Slovak National Uprising
1. Introduction
The issue of sustainability is discussed throughout the scientific field and throughout individual
scientific disciplines from the natural to social sciences. In the latter, the issue has resounded in a
whole number of approaches and research topics, from discussions on environmental sustainability to
economic sustainability and the sustainability of the democratic nature of a given regime. Security
studies (or critical security studies) are a specific field, as they deal with the ways in which politicians
intend to “sustain security”, often in reaction to the changing nature of the world. In this respect,
“securitization”, i.e., the labelling and naming of “threats”, is a crucial concept. A vast number of
approaches and tools are used for securitization, one of which may be references to the past (or political
memory) while shifting it to contemporary political discussions (cf. Strukov and Apryshchenko 2018;
Jutila 2015). This paper builds upon this discussion, i.e., the use of historical references in securitization
processes in contemporary politics. The subject of our research is the use of the legacy of the Slovak
National Uprising (further referred to as SNU) and the context of a significant political event, i.e.,
the annual celebrations of the SNU in Banská Bystrica during the security production of participating
Slovak politicians.
SNU, which was the second largest anti-fascist uprising in all of Europe during the Second World
War (just behind the Yugoslavian partisans) holds a strong position in Slovak national mythology
(Miháliková 2005). Two main topics of the SNU, the relation to the pro-German Slovak State and
the position of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, play a crucial role in the perception of the history
of Slovak nationhood. The public opinion surveys realized after the fall of the communist regime
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conclude that the SNU is perceived as one of the most positive events of Slovak history and the central
commemoration place in Banská Bystrica is one of the strongest symbols of the Slovak nation. Before its
fall, the communist regime utilized the SNU legacy as well—the SNU was the most frequented
topic of Slovak cinematography and has had priority in the sacral topography of many Slovak cities
(Mannová 2008). The celebrations commemorating this event play an important political role, and have
thus become a suitable platform for making political requests that are legitimized by the symbolism of
the event, time and place (Alexander 2006, p. 61) (in general, the commemorations of occasions such as
the SNU can be (and are) utilized as tools of the shaping of collective memory; see (Lehnerová 2017)).
This includes requests to “sustain security”, which is often a reaction to changes taking place in the
international and global context (migration, terrorism, wars). The topic of the Second World War and
the anti-German uprising in speeches given by political actors during the celebrations is often linked
not only with the issue of Slovakia’s security during the Second World War, but also with present
security risks. This is the reason why a significant portion of many political speeches given during the
celebrations includes the creation of moral panic (Cohen 2011; Goode and Ben-Yehudah 2009) or the
securitization (see Buzan et al. 1997; Balzacq 2005) of various phenomena and actors who represent
a source of danger in the ideas of the participating politicians. For this reason, the goal of this text
is to identify the actors and phenomena presented by Slovak political representatives during SNU
celebrations as a source of danger to the sustainability of Slovakia’s security. At the same time, we try to
capture the transformations surrounding the emphasis placed on individual sources of threats between
2015 and 2020. Over this time, we have carried out field research of these celebrations, and some
particular arguments have already been published (Naxera and Krčál 2016; Naxera and Krčál 2017);
the study is linked to the previous Czech-language version (see Naxera and Krčál 2020).
In order to capture the ways in which speakers construct the image of a threat, we use two
concepts—if it is necessary to define certain phenomena as threats, the solution of which requires us to
exceed the framework of standard politics, we label the whole process as securitization (Buzan et al. 1997).
If the phenomenon is being portrayed as a source of threat and a subsequent political mobilization against
this event is taking place, we label it as the creation of moral panic (Cohen 2011). This division stems
from the speakers’ qualitatively and quantitatively differing rhetorical strategies against the individual
sources of threats, which are mutually incommensurable and thus difficult to grasp with only one
concept. The two research questions of this text have been derived from this framework: (1) What
phenomena/topics/actors are a subject of securitization or the creation of moral panic? (2) Which actors
are involved in securitization/the creation of moral panic?
2. Materials and Methods
An appropriately framed past can be used as a justification for various political steps and decisions
(Doucette 2018; Benazzo 2017). A politicized history is an integral part of politics in any type of regime,
including established democracies. The importance of an appropriate and necessary perception of
events (SNU in our case) plays an important role in national mythology. It creates specific cultural ideas
and by doing so strengthens the existing political order, as this order is confirmed by references to an
appropriately ordered past. The instrumental handling of history and the use of variously interpreted
historical events is typical for all types of regimes and political actors.
The Slovak National Uprising, which was an attempt in 1944 to take a stance not only against
Nazi Germany but also the pro-German regime in Slovakia (Kliment and Nakládal 1998), is framed
as one of the foundations of the modern Slovak national mythology and an important milestone
in the development of Slovak statehood (Mannová 2008). For this reason, the legacy of SNU is
still an important theme today and resonates throughout Slovak society and politics. The day that
commemorates the anniversary of the uprising is one of the central points of the Slovak political calendar,
which is important for building and sustaining the identity of the nation and state. The uprising
took place after the several-year existence of the Slovak State, which was an ally of Nazi Germany.
Although the topic of SNU is still quite lively in contemporary politics, references to the existence
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of the Slovak State are less frequent. The question of collective forgetting is thus strongly present in
Slovakia (Michela 2008, p. 9). Although we can find a dominant positive interpretation of SNU in
contemporary Slovak politics, there are streams of thought that understand SNU as an illegitimate
uprising against the first “sovereign” Slovak state in history.
The scene of the central celebrations of SNU’s anniversary is the area of the SNU Museum in
Banská Bystrica, which serves as the central and physical site of collective memory (Norra 1989)
linked to the celebrated event. Objects in public space, e.g., this museum and the victims’ memorial
(Verdery 1999) that forms a part of it, serve as a tool to commemorate historical events linked to the
constitutive points of national mythology. These sites reproduce significances that are often abstract
(victory, nation, and homeland) but have a strong emotional charge (Oláh 2013, p. 730). The emotional
appeal and symbolism are therefore highly utilizable in political speeches, which often take place on
these sites on various occasions. This context makes it possible to play a certain role in the processes
of securitization. Here we use the assumption made by Balzacq (2005), who claims that in order for
the process of securitization to be effective, it is necessary to link it to a certain context and direct it
towards addressing a specific audience. The use of the symbolism of a date, place and event in the
framework of public celebrations provides a platform that fulfills the aforementioned attributes for the
securitizing actors and fosters rhetoric leading to the demonstration of “sustainable security”.
2.1. Theoretical Framework: Moral Panic vs. Securitization
In order to analyze the ways in which the construction of threat sources takes place during
the central celebrations of SNU’s anniversary in Banská Bystrica, we have chosen two theoretical
approaches—the theory of securitization and the theory of moral panic. We perceive securitization
in the way in which it is discussed in the Copenhagen school, i.e., as the creation of a source of
threat linked to the attempt to implement measures that exceed the framework of standard political
measures. We use three basic analytical units in agreement with this approach: (1) a referential object,
i.e., an actor/phenomenon that represents the object of securitization; (2) a securitizing actor, i.e.,
the person who creates and frames a threat via the use of specific rhetorical constructions; and (3) actors
who are not securitizing actors but play an important role in securitization (Buzan et al. 1997).
In order to label an actor as securitizing, his/her argumentation towards a reference object must be
directed towards the attempt at a solution that exceeds the framework of standard politics or towards
what Agamben calls a “state of exception”. This is a solution that, aside from exceeding the standard
framework of politics, calls for a solution that transcends the system of law (Agamben 2005, p. 26).
If some actors/phenomena are portrayed as threats but the aforementioned securitization strategies
do not take place, they will be treated as objects of moral panic. Moral panic is characteristic for
its (re)production of stigmatizing attributes that lead to the perception of objects of moral panic as
sources of (vaguely or specifically denoted) danger (Cohen 2011). The division of analyzed phenomena
into reference objects and objects of moral panic makes it possible to analyze what topics/actors are
securitized and what topics/actors are only portrayed/or as a threat source. In addition, this division
will allow us to provide an interpretation of the specific ways in which securitization takes place via
the use of public events as platforms. The last reason for this analytical division is the fact that it allows
us to identify securitizing actors and the strategies they use.
2.2. Research Materials (Field Research 2015–2020)
The central celebrations of SNU’s anniversary, which take place annually on the day of the
beginning of the uprising (29 August), which is also a national holiday, are a significant political event
with the participation of a score of state representatives, foreign guests and political representatives
from all levels of Slovak politics. In addition to the symbolism of the event’s date, celebrations also
take place in a significant place (Alexander 2006, p. 61). Banská Bystrica was the center of the uprising,
and the celebrations take place in close proximity of the building of the SNU Museum. Although the
events take place over the course of several days, the primary political event takes place in the form of
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a several-hour-long cycle of speeches and commemorative acts. The anniversary of the celebrations
began to be celebrated after WWII, and the celebrations took on different connotations in different
periods, primarily connotations of reproduced meanings and not necessarily of the celebrations
themselves. After the fall of communist regime, the content of the celebrations was changed in relation
to the newly installed ideological order, e.g., the dominant narrative ceased to be dominated by the
emphasis on the Soviet aid to the uprising; on the contrary, the uprising began to be framed as part of
the European and democratic tradition of Slovak statehood (Michela 2014, p. 5). The form and structure
of the celebrations change frequently, however, the main narratives of the SNU celebrations have
remained the same from the fall of the communist regime till today—the legitimization of the Slovak
nationhood in the European context (and the topics that were analyzed by us fits in this framework
well) (Mannová 2019, p. 187). Moreover, they are related to the issues connected to the phenomenon of
security, which plays a crucial role in politics (Ušiak 2018). We can point out that the SNU celebrations
represent a suitable research terrain that can be compared to other similar occasions across Europe.
The whole act (including the accompanying program consisting of concerts or presentation of historical
military technology) is of a similar character and structure each year and consists of a commemorative
act (wreath-laying at the monument), an introductory speech by the host (i.e., the director of the SNU
Museum), and speeches by present state representatives. Each year, appearances are made by the
president, prime minister and chairman of the National Council (i.e., the Slovak Parliament). During the
six-year research, changes have taken place in all of these posts, which, to a certain degree, manifests
itself in the structure and content of the speeches given. The position of president has been held by
Andrej Kiska (2015–2018) and Zuzana Čaputová (2019–2020); position of prime minister by Robert
Fico (2015–2017), Peter Pellegrini (2018–2019) and Igor Matovič (2020); and position of chairman of the
National Council by Peter Pellegrini (2015), Andrej Danko (2016–2019) and Boris Kollár (2020). Apart
from these aforementioned state representatives, the event is annually attended by representatives
of local and regional governments, although not in the position of speakers. One exception is the
former head of the regional self-government of the Banská Bystrica Region, present members of
parliament, and chairman of the People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) Marian Kotleba, who has neo-Nazi
tendencies (Maškarinec 2018). A part of this party’s program is the adoration of the Slovak State
(and its president Jozef Tiso) and the refusal of SNU, which it claims to have been a putsch against
a legitimate government, and its legacy in today’s politics. In addition to refusing to attend the
ceremony, Kotleba demonstrated his dismissive attitude by hanging a black flag from the windows of
his regional office. During the celebrations in 2016, for example, his absence was commented on by
one organizer of the event in the following manner: “I don’t suppose I have to explain why the head of
the regional self-government isn’t here; even so, I couldn’t help making the comment”. As we will point out
below, Kotleba and his relationship to both history and contemporary political preferences became the
topic of speeches during the celebrations in 2017, which took place before the Slovak regional elections,
during which Kotleba planned to defend his mandate.
2.3. Methodology
We observed these celebrations over the course of six consecutive years (2015–2020). Research
took place in the form of semi-participant observation and by recording the form and content of events
into research notes. Semi-participant observation was implemented according to the following scheme:
(1) we covered the whole space that was later to become our research terrain in advance, (2) we took
strategic positions in order to observe both speeches given on the stage and interactions from the
audience, (3) we individually wrote down the findings into research notes, and (4) we then wrote down
the gathered data together into a final field diary, which contains the most accurate possible records
of content (including verbatim quotations from the speeches) and the form of the observed event.
The year 2020 was an exception, as it was not possible to make the research trip due to limitations
caused by the state of the pandemic; this year was therefore analyzed via media representations of
the event, specifically via television broadcast of the ceremonial portion of the whole event. The fact
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that the whole event was broadcast live by public television emphasizes the importance and symbolic
nature of the whole event.
We then worked with the recorded and transcribed speeches as we would with any other text
and processed the data via inductive content analysis. During manual coding, we focused on issues
that were framed as sources of danger (either in the sense of securitization or the creation of moral
panic). We focused primarily on actors of securitization/creation of moral panic and the reference
objects of this effort. The third variable, i.e., indirect actors, is the same in all cases—the direct audience
(present on the spot) and the indirect audience (consumers of the television broadcast and other media
messages covering this event) (Musilová 2014).
During the several-year-long research, one dominant theme (i.e., the reference object in our sense)
was observed in certain years of the celebrations and found throughout individual speeches from the
mouths of politicians, who made up an ideologically and politically heterogenous group. The majority
of topics, which we will deal with in more detail below, is linked with security or the issue of sustaining
it. It was also possible to observe different levels of emphasis placed on the given problem and
reflected in differentiating securitization and the creation of moral panic. The celebrations in 2015 were
strongly influenced by the so-called migration crisis, and the topic of migration therefore resonated as
a central motif; the legacy of SNU was used to take a stance against migrants coming from Europe.
The celebrations of 2016 were dominated by Slovakia’s both negatively and positively interpreted
relationship with Russia and the EU. The following year was influenced by ongoing elections to regional
governments and the strong stance of political actors against the head of the regional self-government
of the time, Kotleba, or in general against the phenomenon of (neo-)Nazism and (neo-)fascism (however,
references aimed at Kotleba were strong in 2015 and 2016 as well). This issue, i.e., taking a stance
against right-wing extremism, seems natural in the context of the celebrations of an anti-fascist uprising.
The celebrations of 2018 lacked a dominant theme, and speeches in this year were also held in a less
confrontational spirit in terms of portraying threats of danger to Slovakia than in prior years. We can
say the same for 2019, although in this case (although not to such a degree as in 2017), we can find a
stance against present extremism. The same can be said for 2020. In this year, several references to the
threat of COVID-19 were made, although more implicitly than explicitly.
As we have already stated, the third unit of the securitization process, i.e., the creation of moral
panic, which consists of indirect actors, remains outside the framework of our interest, as they are
the same in all cases. Their role was passive in the observed events and stemmed from the fact that
they were the recipients of the performed utterances (directly or via the media). For our research,
other variables were relevant—these include the actors of securitization/creation of moral panic
(i.e., participating politicians—see above), but primarily also reference objects (i.e., presented sources
of danger) that are projected into the structure of the coding tree. Individual sub-codes portraying
the essence of the source of danger were allocated to each reference object (i.e., code). The method of
coding is shown in the table below (see Table 1). Although analysis took place based on codes and
sub-codes, the following sections are structured in the following manner: each section deals with one
code, i.e., of reference objects; however, the section is not ordered inwardly according to sub-codes, but
according to actors of securitization/creation of moral panic and celebration years—the goal of this is
to record a potential transformation in the rhetoric of individual actors over the course of time.
Table 1. The code structure.
Right-Wing Extremism Migration Selected Actors of European Politics
Physical threat







Russia as a threat
The EU as a threat
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Methodological note: verbatim quotes listed below are taken from interviews during the
celebrations. It is evident from the quote who made the speech and in what year; therefore, we have
not included a link in the interest of the text’s fluidity.
3. Analysis and Results
3.1. Right-Wing Extremism
It is logical to start with the topic of Nazism and fascism as threats to Slovakia, as the SNU was
led against the regime of the Slovak State and its subjugation to Nazi Germany. Celebrations of SNU’s
anniversary are therefore led in the spirit of anti-Nazism and anti-fascism, not only in relation to the
historical events of the Second World War, but also to the Slovak political party system. Slovakia has
had an almost constant experience with the presence of extreme-right parties in its parliament since the
fall of communism. The Slovak National Party, long led by Ján Slota, has almost always been a part of
the parliament (with the exception of 2002–2006 and 2010–2012) (see Kluknavská and Smolík 2016) and
in some cases was the ruling party. However, in 2016, the extreme-right scene took on a new dimension
thanks to the parliamentary success of the neo-Nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia linked to Marian
Kotleba. The success of this party is based on changes within the Slovak party system (Hynčica 2019).
In 2013, Kotleba won the second round of the election for head of the regional self-government of the
Banská Bystrica Region (Buček and Plešivčák 2017; Mikuš et al. 2016), and his party gained more than
8% of the vote in 2016, giving them a total of 14 mandates in the Slovak Parliament. The celebrations
that took place a year later significantly reacted not only to Kotleba’s year-old parliamentary success,
but also to the upcoming local government elections in 2017. References focusing on the danger that
Kotleba and (neo-)Nazism and (neo-)fascism in general pose had already appeared earlier.
The basis of the majority of speeches throughout individual years is the adoration of SNU,
the explicit stance against fascism and Nazism, and the explicit or implicit stance against the Slovak
State as the bearer of this ideology. Similar statements could be found among all speakers. At the
same time, reference to WWII, fallen partisan heroes, and speeches of the oft-mentioned self-sacrifice
of the Slovak nation are shifted from the past to the present and used within the contemporary
political struggle.
In 2015, speeches on a general level were aimed against the threat of Nazism, while Marian
Kotleba was not explicitly mentioned. These references (of which there were less in comparison to
the following years) were focused not only on the protection of the legacy of SNU, on which doubt
was being cast by the extreme right, but also on the social danger of the existence of an extreme right.
For example, the chairman of the National Council Peter Pellegrini said the following during the 2015
celebrations: “We cannot allow the toleration of Nazis. We cannot agree to guards marching through our
streets, beating people up”. By saying this, he thus framed the (neo-)Nazis as a source of direct physical
threat to the population.
A far more vehement appeal against the extreme right resounded in 2016 after Kotleba’s success
in parliament elections, although Kotleba was not directly mentioned in this year but rather through
certain allusions. The situation was expressed succinctly by Pavel Sečkář, chairman of the Slovak
Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters: “After the elections for parliament, the shaved heads that were giving the Nazi
salute in the streets are now lounging in the benches of parliament”. In his speech, President Andrej Kiska
also touched upon the topic as he searched for political parallels between the time of the uprising and
the present: participants in the uprising overcame political, ideological and religious differences and
agreed that freedom and racial and religious equality are the more important values. According to
Kiska, these values also apply to contemporary Slovak society and it is important to actively defend
them. It is not possible to associate oneself with the legacy of SNU and at the same time tolerate
the idea that SNU was a “stain” on Slovak history. We can consider this to be a clear stance against
Kotleba’s perception of SNU and the Slovak State. Robert Fico also spoke in a similar spirit when,
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in reaction to election results, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that a number of political
entities had chosen hatred as their program.
In relation to stances against (neo-)Nazism and (neo-)fascism, doubtlessly the most interesting
celebrations took place in 2017, shortly before elections to regional government and the realistic
threat that Kotleba would defend his mandate and leadership of the region. President Kiska’s speech
contained a strong anti-Kotleba message: “It is not enough to commemorate and make speeches while the
posthumous sons of fascism are roaming the streets. When a fascist won, it was a shock for Banská Bystrica.
When he entered the parliament, it was an even greater shock. We are trying to come to terms with this and react
to the fascists. What hatred is hidden behind their smiles and green shirts. Their only contribution to the public
debate has been the spread of hatred. They know how to intimidate and bully; they do not know how to administer
public affairs”. He also framed the topic in the context of the upcoming regional elections: “We will
stand up to evil and drive the fascists out of the Banská Bystrica Region. Kotleba sees the beginning of SNU as
the darkest day in Slovak history, and his only contribution has been to spread hatred. Region by region, we must
not give up our beautiful country to fascists. We do not have to fight with weapons in our hands, and we do not
have to be heroes. It is enough to be true citizens, participate in democratic elections and choose a non-fascist
candidate. There are more of us and we can defeat them, and we can draw courage from those who stood up to
evil in incomparably worse conditions.” During this appeal, he deftly instrumentalized the past—taking
part in elections at present and voting against fascists is a certain analogy to the anti-fascist struggle of
the participants in SNU.
Mobilization rhetoric was also used by the chairman of the Slovak National Party and chairman of
the National Council Andrej Danko, who called upon voters to “remove the Nazis from the region”. Prime
Minister Fico, who linked the current threat of (neo-)Nazism with the legacy of the Slovak State, spoke
in a similar spirit: “[We all know] what Slovakia looked like at the time when the Slovak State existed as one of
Hitler’s underlings. Life was calm here, but Nazis and guard members were walking around, and Slovaks were
participating. And next door [to the site of the celebrations] is a building that is once again being called “Na
stráž” [a salute used during the Slovak State by Slovak Nazis, that can be translated as “On guard”],
and we have the feeling that this is ok. [ . . . ] Freedom of speech doesn’t mean giving the Nazi salute, chanting
“Na stráž“, and so forth. I am calling upon law enforcement to take action”.
The celebrations of 2018 took place in a much less confrontational spirit. Clear reference to
Kotleba was made again by Pellegrini, who called voters of the extreme right, who were doubting
the legacy of SNU, people who had no respect for history and belonged in the “ash heap of history”.
At the same time, he thanked residents of the region for coming together in the 2017 elections and
creating a “small SNU” by driving out Kotleba from his function as the head of the region and thus
protecting the legacy of SNU. In 2019, however, a stronger warning of the threat of present extremism
could be observed. Andrej Danko claimed that it was a disgrace that “people who are distorting history,
putting on fascist uniforms and enjoying the trust of citizens are in politics” and by doing so implicitly
referred to Kotleba’s party. Prime Minister Pellegrini also took a stance against far-right extremism,
pointing out propaganda and calls for violence that were spread via social networks. He pointed to the
trend of transforming and reducing extremist rhetoric—at present, right-wing extremists are hiding
behind values of conservatism and traditionalism. In 2020, several mentions were made of subduing
contemporary extremism with regard to showing respect for fallen fighters and participants in SNU.
Present right-wing extremism was thus framed across years and actors as a security risk in various
regards (Buzan et al. 1997). Firstly, it is a physical threat to the population, which was explicitly
mentioned in analyzed speeches (“guards marching through our streets, beating people up”). In these words,
the speakers were pointing to the phenomenon of creating paramilitary groups that are symptomatic
of this form of extremism. However, this does not necessarily entail paramilitary units such as the
Czech National Militia or the Hungarian Guard Movement; in the Slovak political context, they may
be embodied in a distinctly more banal example—groups of LSNS members in party t-shirts who
decided voluntarily to patrol Slovak trains. By doing so, they also disrupted the authority of the
state’s institutions, as they attempted to break the Weberian monopoly of state power to carry out
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physical violence and justice. At the same time, right-wing extremism is presented as a threat to the
democratic order and the constitutionality of the Slovak state. As Slovak political identity is seen as
anti-fascist in individual speeches thanks to the legacy of SNU, contemporary right-wing extremism is
also understood as a danger to the nation’s identity.
Despite the fact that fascism and Nazism (or right-wing extremism) are portrayed by a number
of speakers as a threat (and a relatively fundamental one targeting different aspects of the operation
of the state and society), they are not a reference object of the process of securitization, as calls for
action exceeding the framework of standard politics are not taking place (Buzan et al. 1997). On the
contrary, the dominant and requested solution presented by individual actors was linked to a call
for standard democratic procedures, primarily the need to come together in elections and defeat the
extremists. On the other hand, such framing of extremism fully corresponds to the creation of moral
panic (Cohen 2011). The phenomenon of right-wing extremism was one of the most frequented topics
that can be explained by several arguments. Firstly, the participating actors perceived the right-wing
extremism as a most imminent threat to the sustainability of security in Slovakia. Secondly, this was
amplified by the situation with (neo-)Nazi politician Kotleba mentioned above. Thirdly, the creating of
moral panic around right-wing extremism suits well the general framework created around the SNU
legacy narrative. The avoidance of securitization of right-wing extremism and creating moral panic
around it can serve as an illustration that the participating actors were asserting standard political
countermeasures (unlike the topic of migration; see below).
3.2. Migration
The topic of migration tends to be a frequent subject of securitization (Bourbeau 2011; Krotký 2019),
and the context of Slovak politics is not an exception (Androvičová 2015). Negative references about
migrants within Slovak politics were strongly evident before elections in 2016, but the fundamental
breaking point had already come in the summer of 2015 (Žúborová and Borárosová 2017, p. 10), when
both a worsening in the media’s picture of refugeeism and the strengthening of negative statements
on the part of politicians, primarily Prime Minister Robert Fico, could be observed. Slovakia mostly
avoided the wave of migration, which was reflected in the vague statements made by politicians shortly
after the so-called migration crisis broke out. These statements were mostly in the line of “it’s the
EU’s problem, not Slovakia’s”. In 2015 and 2016, however, a “defensive discourse” appeared, framing
migration as a security threat for Slovakia. This manifested itself in a change in the Smer party’s
primary slogan, which shifted from its original “Smer works for Slovakia” to “Smer is protecting
Slovakia” (Žúborová and Borárosová 2017, p. 8). Fico, head of the Smer party, was the most respected
politician speaking about migration in the media at the time. The negative framing of migrants became
the political mainstream, while President Kiska was an exception. Prime Minister Fico went the farthest
in saying that the secret service should monitor all Muslims on Slovakia’s territory (Žúborová and
Borárosová 2017).
In regard to the fact that existing research placed the breaking point for the negative framing of
migration in the summer of 2015, this approach manifested itself in the SNU celebrations in the same
year. It is also interesting that, with the exception of occasional mention, the topic did not appear
in speeches in other years (2016–2020). In 2015, however, almost all speakers (although in different
ways) expressed their views concerning migration, and migration became the central theme of the
celebrations. Robert Fico profiled himself as the fiercest opponent of migration, which corresponds to
the aforementioned research (Žúborová and Borárosová 2017).
Fico devoted a significant portion of his speech to the topic of migration, beginning with SNU,
continuing on about the security threat posed by immigrants, and returning to SNU. According to Fico,
fascism was a threat that Slovakia stood up to thanks to SNU—now there is a new threat—the threat of
migration—and it is necessary for Slovakia to stand up to this threat too and not to disappoint SNU’s
legacy. In the prime minister’s words, the situation of refugees is regrettable, but “we”, i.e., Slovaks
and Europeans in general, must also be protected. Therefore, it is not possible to risk European security
Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 194 9 of 13
in order to save refugees. The creation of this “us” (Slovaks, Europeans) versus “them” (migrants)
dichotomy can be seen as a basic categorization in the narrative of (in)security; at the same time, it is
one of the basic categories of populist strategy (Knight 1998, p. 223). As Fico went on: “Let’s not
pretend that we don’t see the people’s fear. They are afraid, not only in Slovakia, but in all of Europe. Let’s
not pretend that we don’t see the causes of this phenomenon, and let’s not pretend that we’re able to solve this
problem by welcoming everyone with open arms, regardless of whether they’re economic schemers or people
who need protection for their lives, health and family”. In Fico’s words, Slovakia did not take part in the
bombing of Syria or Libya and thus did not take part in their destabilization. Therefore, he cannot be
reprimanded for not helping refugees, as he does not carry the blame for the state that their homes
are now in. Although it is necessary to differentiate between individuals who are arriving because of
finances and individuals who are fleeing war, Slovakia is not required to help either group. Fico took a
stance against the local opponents of this opinion as “pseudo-humanists welcoming refugees”. “Europe
is facing an uncontrolled influx of refugees from various parts of the world. European politics has completely
failed in terms of migration, [ . . . uncontrolled] immigration can destroy Slovakia and Europe [ . . . ], Let us be
honest—we’re not able to integrate our own Roma citizens, of which there are hundreds of thousands. How can
we integrate people who are in a completely different place in terms of their life and religion? [ . . . ] If the idea of
quotas reappears, we will once again refuse it”. He added that Christians are able to integrate, which is,
however, in contradiction with his previous statement about problems with integrating Romas, who
by vast majority are Roman Catholic. In his conclusion, Fico shifted from migration and returned
to SNU, deftly utilizing its legacy: “We must protect traditions, values and democracy, and if we can’t
protect them sufficiently from immigrants, elections will be won by fascists and Nazis, who will take on this
problem in a completely different way. The people whom the Slovak National Uprising was lead against would
win”. The other speakers either dealt with migration only marginally, from a different perspective,
or not at all.
It is possible to say that the securitization issues identified by the analysis do not represent
the dominant broad shared discourse of the SNU celebrations narrative. On the other hand, we
can highlight the fact that the main securitizing actor was Prime Minister Robert Fico. Since the
phenomenon of migration was securitized mainly by the prime minister, the relevance of it remains
intact (despite the fact that the securitization of migration does not stand as a leitmotif of the SNU
celebrations narrative. If we take a closer look at the framing of migration by Robert Fico, we can
see it as a securitized phenomenon, which is evident both from the intensity of the given threat’s
portrayal and the repertoire of suggested solutions exceeding standard politics (e.g., the idea that
the secret services should monitor all Muslims in Slovakia) and legal norms (the refusal of quotas
to redistribute migrants exceeds legal norms on an EU level). The threat to Slovakia by migration
is evident on several levels—the first is an economic threat (i.e., “economic migrants” who will
harm the state’s economy via their presence), threats stemming from a “threat to culture or social
cohesion” (Czajka 2014; Mukhin 2015; Lægard 2010) due to cultural differentness and the impossibility
of integrating (alleged) newcomers, and of course a physical threat (“migrants are potential terrorists”).
The last line of endangerment can strengthen extremist tendencies in society (“if we aren’t against
migration, people will vote for Kotleba”).
3.3. Russia and the European Union
The last reference objects that we will deal with are the significant players in European politics
(and beyond), i.e., the EU and Russia, and the relationship between Slovakia’s security and these
actors. We have decided to include the EU and Russia into one chapter, as the speeches of the analyzed
actors (primarily Robert Fico, who gave this topic, just like migration, the most attention) frequently
contained negative framing of one actor and the positive framing of another. The topic of the EU and
Russia was emphasized most strongly in 2015 and 2016, primarily in relation to the so-called migration
crisis, and also the EU’s attitude towards Russia.
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In his speech in 2015, chairman of the National Council Pellegrini defined three significant security
threats that Europe and Slovakia must take into consideration—Russian foreign policy activities, war
in Ukraine, and migration. However, he did not specify in greater detail how exactly they represent a
threat, how to deal with it, etc. Russia, however, is clearly labelled a threat source (even a two-fold
threat, as Russia is also the actor of war in the Ukraine).
Fico spoke in much more detail about the security connotations of Slovakia’s relationship towards
the EU and Russia. “The Slovak National Uprising is a pearl that people of every nation and state would be proud
of. This pearl allows us to speak the truth”. According to Fico, one of these truths is that Czechoslovakia
was sold out by the West in Munich. By saying this, he began his stance against the West, which
continued throughout his whole speech and culminated in criticism of the EU in connection with
its migration policy and the danger that migrants are said to pose to the EU: “Europe is facing an
uncontrolled influx of migrants from various parts of the world. European politics has completely failed in
terms of migration [ . . . ] If the idea of quotas reappears, we will once again refuse it”. He added to this
stance against the EU by claiming to be aware of the fact that there were numerous representatives of
European countries in the audience who, as he hoped, would pass on the message to their governments
and to Brussels. Uncontrolled “immigration can destroy Slovakia and Europe”. Therefore, no one can force
upon anyone else the obligatory acceptance of refugees. “The country has the right to choose who they
want to accept and in what number”. Thus, in Fico’s words, the EU’s policy clearly presents a risk for the
sustainability of Slovakia’s security, primarily due to migration policy, but also due to escalations in
relations with Russia.
In 2016, Fico made a symbolic connection to his previous speech to a certain degree when he
claimed he was worried that some representatives of Slovak and European policy are looking for
an enemy to whom they could pass on all their problems. He emphasized that he was refusing any
antipathy in Russian–Slovak affairs and the pinning of causes of all problems on Russia. At the same
time, it was clear in his speech that the figure framing Russia in such a way was the European Union.
Fico also warned of a possible escalation of conflict between Europe and Russia (explicitly mentioning
former British Prime Minister May, who admitted her willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary).
The Soviet Union took the lion’s share of defeating Nazism, and it is not possible to make an enemy
out of Russia. Robert Fico was thus the only speaker in 2015 (rather implicitly) and 2016 (strongly
explicitly) to defend an alliance with Russia on one hand and take a stance against the EU on the other.
If we summarize the relationship of both speakers towards both these actors of European politics
and their framing as a threat, we find two narratives. The first is the labelling of Russia as an unspecified
threat, and the second is the EU labelled as a threat by Robert Fico. The reason for viewing the EU
in this manner is its migration policy. The EU is thus an actor that indirectly threatens Slovakia by
supporting a direct source of Slovakia’s endangerment, i.e., migration, which is securitized by Fico in
his following speeches. At the same time, we cannot claim that Robert Fico has made the EU into an
object of securitization; however, his argumentation does fulfill the attributes of the creation of moral
panic. Pellegrini’s labelling of Russia as a threat was a brief and vague statement without implications,
and, therefore, we can consider it to be neither moral panic nor securitization. As you can see above,
the speeches related to the EU and Russia are marginal in comparison to the speeches related to the
right-wing extremism and migration. Nevertheless, the EU and Russia were mentioned by two state
representatives holding crucial functions within the political system—we decided to mention this
for completeness.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In the following sections of this text, we have focused on four reference objects that were mentioned
in relation to SNU anniversary celebrations in connection with the sustainability of Slovakia’s security
and framed by the legacy of SNU—these include (right-wing) extremism, migration, Russia and the
EU. In all cases, these are themes that are fundamental for contemporary European politics (of both
European countries individually and the EU as a whole). At least in the context of V4 countries,
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we can observe the success of the extreme right (although with differing intensity among countries)
(Kazharsky 2017); strong anti-migration stances of a significant portion of the political representation
and in some cases the regime as such (Kalmar 2018); criticism of European politics (Kaniok and
Havlík 2016); and a swing on the part of the political representation towards Russia (Benazzo 2017).
The majority of these topics is also linked with the ongoing discussion on the possible decline of liberal
democracy in Central Europe (Bustikova and Guasti 2017).
As we have already stated, Slovakia was not able to avoid the success of the extreme right on a
parliamentary level. Other actors on the Slovak political scene reacted to Marian Kotleba’s success
by taking a strong stance against the extreme right or creating moral panic from it. At the same time,
however, this was not the securitization of the extreme right, as the tools called for by the speakers to
be aimed at the extreme right did not exceed the framework of standard politics, and quite the contrary
is true. The extreme right was mentioned in terms of the observed SNU anniversary celebrations across
individual years and speakers. Pointing to the problematic nature and the danger of (neo-)Nazism and
(neo-)fascism is not only a matter of SNU anniversary celebrations—it is a wider political phenomenon.
However, the argument against the extreme right expressed during the celebrations can rely on the
symbolism of the place, time and event (Alexander 2006, p. 61). Thus, historical legacy is used to
support current political demands, which are directly linked to this legacy in terms of the construction
of moral panic concerning (neo-)Nazism and (neo-)fascism. On the other hand, it was possible to
identify situations in which the legacy of SNU was instrumentalized by the speaker to support political
demands that had no connection with the celebrated event. An example of this is Robert Fico, who took
the position of the “only securitizer” throughout the various years, using the legacy of SNU to securitize
migration (and create moral panic against the European Union), which he put in direct connection with
this legacy. The other speakers across the years spoke of the sustainability of Slovakia’s security to a
much lesser degree (with the exception of right-wing extremism), speaking about it only occasionally
and without more detailed argumentation. The results are summarized in the Table 2 below.





Securitization/Moral panic Moral panic Securitization EU—moral panic/Russia—xxx
Securitizing actor (only in the case of securitization) xxx Robert Fico Xxx
Link to the celebrated historical event YES NO NO
The example of Robert Fico thus precisely demonstrates the use of a de facto unconnected historical
legacy to securitize migration. The role of this legacy in Slovakia’s national mythology, which it helps
to sustain throughout the generations, is so significant that it allows for the creation of a platform
used by politicians to manifest their willingness to maintain the country’s security (but realistically
only manifesting their own political vision without regard to its (dis)connection with the celebrated
event). When seeing our results and conclusions in a broader context, we can say that the theories of
securitization/moral panic are relevant frameworks to analyze the construction of security narratives
during public occasions. We show that public political ceremonies can be used as instruments that
serve as platforms for the creation of security narratives. And, of course, it is not the only case in
Slovakia (and the SNU celebrations). Our paper can be seen as a contribution to the wider debate
about the use of history in contemporary politics.
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